Here are my Sunday School handouts for the lessons on Jihad. The first page is from Religious Tolerance.org and represents the mainstream media,liberal elite viewpoint.The historical section is taken from the finest book on the history of Jihad that I have read- The Legacy of Jihad,by Andrew Bostom. It is well worth your purchase and time spent reading.

There is a huge difference between the meaning given to Jihad by Muslim apologists and by the fruit of Islam throughout thousands of years of history. Judge for yourself what the true meaning of Jihad is today.

Quotation
“The best jihad [struggle] is (by) the one who strives against his own self for Allah, The Mighty and Majestic,” Hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad). ₁
“Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loves not transgressors.” Qur’an, Chapter 2, verse 190.

Meanings of “Jihad:”

“Jihad” and “Mujahid” (one who carries out a jihad) are two religious words that have been given multiple meanings:
Many accounts in the media define “jihad” as a synonym for “holy war,” — a vicious clash between followers of different religions, each of whom believes that God is on their side and that the other side is is of Satan. This usage often appears on Western TV, radio, and other media during news about the Middle East, where it is used to describe a call for Muslims to fight against non-Muslims in the defense of Islam. Some Muslims have begun to adopt this meaning of “jihad” as a result of Western influence.
Others use the term as a synonym for a struggle of any type. This reflects the origin of the word from the Arabic verb “jahada” which means to struggle or fight.

The conventional interpretation of “Jihad”:

According to Beliefnet, ₂ Al-Hajj Talib ‘Abdur-Rashid, imam of the Mosque of Islamic Brotherhood in Harlem, NY, defines three levels of jihad — personal, verbal and physical. Considering each in turn:
Personal Jihad: This is the most important form. This type of jihad, called the Jihadun-Nafs, is the intimate struggle to purify one’s soul of evil influences — both subtle and overt. It is the struggle to cleanse one’s spirit of sin. In a brochure, the Institute of Islamic Information & Education describes several different contexts in which The Qur’an (the Islamic Holy Book) and the Hadith (the collected sayings of Muhammad) use the word “jihad” to refer to personal struggles:
Putting “Allah ahead of our loved ones, our wealth, our worldly ambitions and our own lives.”
Resisting pressure of parents, peers and society; strive against “the rejecters of faith…” (Quran 25:52)
“…strive and struggle to live as true Muslims…

“Striving for righteous deeds.”
Spreading the message of Islam. “The (true) believers are only those who believe in Allah and his messenger and afterward doubt not, but strive with their wealth and their selves for the cause of Allah. Such are the truthful.” (Quran, 49:15)
Verbal Jihad: To strive for justice through words and non-violent actions. Muhammad encouraged Muslims to demand justice in the name of Allah. When asked: “‘What kind of jihad is better?‘ Muhammad replied, ‘A word of truth in front of an oppressive ruler!‘” ₃ According to the Institute of Islamic Information and Education: “The life of the Prophet Muhammad was full of striving to gain the freedom to inform and convey the message of Islam. During his stay in Makkah [Mecca] he used non-violent methods and after the establishment of his government in Madinah [Medina], by the permission of Allah, he used armed struggle against his enemies whenever he found it inevitable.” ₁
Physical Jihad: This relates to the use of physical force in defense of Muslims against oppression and transgression by the enemies of Allah, Islam and Muslims. Allah commands that Muslims lead peaceful lives and not transgress against anyone. If they are persecuted and oppressed, the Qur’an recommends that they migrate to a more peaceful and tolerant land: “Lo! Those who believe, and those who emigrate (to escape persecution) and strive (Jahadu) in the way of Allah, these have hope of Allah’s mercy…” (Quran, 2:218). If relocation is not possible, then Allah also requires Muslims to defend themselves against oppression by “fighting against those who fight against us.” ₂ The Qur’an states: “To those against whom war is made, permission is given [to defend themselves], because they are wronged – and verily, Allah is Most Powerful to give them victory.” (22:39) The defensive nature of physical jihad (or “jihad with the hand“) is frequently lost among many, Muslims, Christians, secularists and others.

In her book “Muhammed,” author Karen Armstrong writes: “Fighting and warfare might sometimes be necessary, but it was only a minor part of the whole jihad or struggle. A well-known tradition (hadith) has Muhammad say on returning from a battle, ‘ We return from the little jihad to the greater jihad,’ the more difficult and crucial effort to conquer the forces of evil in oneself and and in one’s own society in all the details of daily life.” ₄

Other interpretations of “Jihad”:

Both the Judeo-Christian Holy Bible and the Muslim Holy Qur’an are large religious books, containing a great range of material dealing with religion, spirituality, justice, laws, love, etc. And they also contain references to violence, hate, murder, war, and even genocide.
It would be quite possible to assemble passages from the Bible — particularly the Hebrew Scriptures (a.k.a. Old Testament) which describe genocide, rape, execution of non-virgin brides, murder of homosexuals, torture of prisoners, the rape of female prisoners of war, murder of a family because of the act of the father, the regulation and condoning of human slavery, and many other acts, cultural traditions, and laws which are profoundly immoral by today’s religious and secular standards. If all one read of the Bible was a collection of such passages, one might conclude that the Bible is an evil document that promotes violence, unethical behavior. One might even conclude that it should be banned as hate literature.
Similarly, it is possible to scan the Bible for passages relating to humans’ love of God; love of humans by God; striving for justice; supporting widows, orphans, the sick, the imprisoned; love and concern for fellow humans; spirituality; and may other acts, cultural traditions, and laws which promote a loving, moral and ethical life. If all one read of the Bible was a collection of such passages, one might conclude that the Bible is a precious document indeed — one worthy of emulating.

Which group of passages represent the real Bible? They both do! For centuries, Christians have searched for guidance on social conflicts like the abolition of human slavery, equal rights and opportunities for women, equal rights and protections for gays and lesbians, etc. Some search for specific passages in the Bible dealing with these issues. A few concluded that slavery is an acceptable institution, that women should be oppressed and denied rights, and that gays (and perhaps lesbians as well) should be executed. Others search for passages dealing with general themes, such as love, justice, and caring for ones fellow humans, and concluded the opposite. Others have used other techniques to assess the Bible’s messages. Which represents the “true” message of the Bible? They both do. And this is the reason why there are over 1,000 Christian groups in North America, all basing their beliefs and practices on the Bible, and yet teaching conflicting many beliefs about deity, humanity and the rest of the universe.

The Qur’an is similar.
A small percentage of Muslims who are from the extreme, radical and violent wing of Islamic Fundamentalism, and who are “…passionate, [deeply] religious and anti-Western…” ₅ might dwell on passages or verses dealing with conflict, war, and resistance to oppression. Many conclude that the Qur’an expects them to engage in acts of terrorism, assassinations, suicide bombings, armed aggression against persons of other religions, oppression of women, executing innocent persons, etc.
Those Muslim Fundamentalists who are not extreme, violent and radical, and those Muslims from mainline or liberal wings of the religion might concentrate on passages and themes of spirituality, justice, personal struggle, peace, freedom, etc.

They are consulting the same book, with a different emphasis, and achieve very different results.

We see the same split among Christians as they study Islam and the Qur’an.
Some emphasize the earlier passages in the Qur’an which emphasize cooperation with the Jews and Christians — the “People of the Book.” They tend to interpret “Jihad” in terms of personal struggle towards purity.
Others emphasize later passages of the Qur’an which were received during a time of conflict. They tend to interpret “Jihad” as holy war.

They come to opposite conclusions about whether Islam is a religion of peace or war.

http://www.religioustolerance.org/isl_jihad.htm

What is Jihad?

by Daniel Pipes
New York Post
December 31, 2002

http://www.danielpipes.org/990/what-is-jihad

What does the Arabic word jihad mean?

One answer came last week, when Saddam Hussein had his Islamic leaders appeal to Muslims worldwide to join his jihad to defeat the “wicked Americans” should they attack Iraq; then he himself threatened the United States with jihad.

As this suggests, jihad is “holy war.” Or, more precisely: It means the legal, compulsory, communal effort to expand the territories ruled by Muslims at the expense of territories ruled by non-Muslims.

The purpose of jihad, in other words, is not directly to spread the Islamic faith but to extend sovereign Muslim power (faith, of course, often follows the flag). Jihad is thus unabashedly offensive in nature, with the eventual goal of achieving Muslim dominion over the entire globe.

Jihad did have two variant meanings through the centuries, one more radical, one less so. The first holds that Muslims who interpret their faith differently are infidels and therefore legitimate targets of jihad. (This is why Algerians, Egyptians and Afghans have found themselves, like Americans and Israelis, so often the victims of jihadist aggression.) The second meaning, associated with mystics, rejects the legal definition of jihad as armed conflict and tells Muslims to withdraw from the worldly concerns to achieve spiritual depth.

Jihad in the sense of territorial expansion has always been a central aspect of Muslim life. That’s how Muslims came to rule much of the Arabian Peninsula by the time of the Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632. It’s how, a century later, Muslims had conquered a region from Afghanistan to Spain. Subsequently, jihad spurred and justified Muslim conquests of such territories as India, Sudan, Anatolia, and the Balkans.

Today, jihad is the world’s foremost source of terrorism, inspiring a worldwide campaign of violence by self-proclaimed jihadist groups:

• The International Islamic Front for the Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders: Osama bin Laden’s organization;
• Laskar Jihad: responsible for the murder of more than 10,000 Christians in Indonesia;
• Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami: a leading cause of violence in Kashmir;
• Palestinian Islamic Jihad: the most vicious anti-Israel terrorist group of them all;
• Egyptian Islamic Jihad: killed Anwar El-Sadat in 1981, many others since, and
• Yemeni Islamic Jihad: killed three American missionaries on Monday.

But jihad’s most ghastly present reality is in Sudan, where until recently the ruling party bore the slogan “Jihad, Victory and Martyrdom.” For two decades, under government auspices, jihadists there have physically attacked non-Muslims, looted their belongings and killed their males.

Jihadists then enslaved tens of thousands of females and children, forced them to convert to Islam, sent them on forced marches, beat them and set them to hard labor. The women and older girls also suffered ritual gang-rape, genital mutilation and a life of sexual servitude.

Sudan’s state-sponsored jihad has caused about 2 million deaths and the displacement of another 4 million – making it the greatest humanitarian catastrophe of our era.

Despite jihad’s record as a leading source of conflict for 14 centuries, causing untold human suffering, academic and Islamic apologists claim it permits only defensive fighting, or even that it is entirely non-violent. Three American professors of Islamic studies colorfully make the latter point, explaining jihad as:

• An “effort against evil in the self and every manifestation of evil in society” (Ibrahim Abu-Rabi, Hartford Seminary);
• “Resisting apartheid or working for women’s rights” (Farid Eseck, Auburn Seminary), and
• “Being a better student, a better colleague, a better business partner. Above all, to control one’s anger” (Bruce Lawrence, Duke University).

It would be wonderful were jihad to evolve into nothing more aggressive than controlling one’s anger, but that will not happen simply by wishing away a gruesome reality. To the contrary, the pretense of a benign jihad obstructs serious efforts at self-criticism and reinterpretation.

The path away from terrorism, conquest and enslavement lies in Muslims forthrightly acknowledging jihad’s historic role, followed by apologies to jihad’s victims, developing an Islamic basis for nonviolent jihad and (the hardest part) actually ceasing to wage violent jihad.

Unfortunately, such a process of redemption is not now under way; violent jihad will probably continue until it is crushed by a superior military force (Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, please take note). Only when jihad is defeated will moderate Muslims finally find their voice and truly begin the hard work of modernizing Islam.

http://www.danielpipes.org/990/what-is-jihad

The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims by Andrew G. Bostom M.D.

According to Muhammad’s biographer Ibn Ishaq, Muhammad chose one of the Qurayzah women (Rayhana) for himself. The Qurayzah’s property and other possessions (including weapons) were also divided up as additional “booty” among the Muslims. The following details have been chronicled consistently by Muslim sources: The arbiter (Sa’d Mu’adh) was appointed by Muhammad.

himself; Muhammad observed in person the horrific executions; Muhammad claimed as a wife a woman (Rayhana) previously married to one of the slaughtered Qurayzah tribesmen; the substantial material benefits (i.e., property, receipts from the sale of the enslaved) that accrued to the Muslims as a result of the massacre; the extinction of the Qurayzah.

What makes it clearer still is the assertion of another biographer that Muhammad had refused to treat with the Bani Quraiza at all until they had “come down to receive the judgment of the Apostle of God.” Accordingly “they came down”; in other words put themselves in his power. And only then was the arbitration of Sa’ad proposed and accepted-but not accepted until it had been forced on him by Muhammad; for Sa’ad first declined and tried to make Muhammad take the responsibility, but was told “qad amarak Allahu takhumafihim” “Allah has commanded you to give sentence in their case.” From every point of view therefore the evidence is simply crushing that Muhammad was the ultimate author of this massacre.

The theory of the treatment of non-Muslims was in part derived and developed by theologians and Qur’anic commentators from Sura IX. 29: Fight against such of those who have been given the Scripture as believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, and forbid not that which Allah hath forbidden by His messenger, and follow not the religion of truth, until they pay the tribute readily, being brought low.

Sir Isaiah Berlin once described an ideologue as somebody who is prepared to suppress what he suspects to be true. Berlin then concluded that from that disposition to suppress the truth has flowed much of the evil of this and other centuries. The first duty of the intellectual is to tell the truth. By suppressing the truth, however honorable the motive, we are only engendering an even greater evil.

how contemporary historiography whitewashed the basic realities of jihad war: In a major encyclopedia, one reads phrases such as: “Islam expanded in the eighth or ninth centuries …”; “This or that country passed into Muslim hands….” But care is taken not to say how Islam expanded, how countries “passed into [Muslim] hands.” . . . Indeed, it would seem as if events happened by themselves, through a miraculous or amicable operation…. Regarding this expansion, little is said about jihad. And yet it all happened through war! … the jihad is an institution, and not an event, that is to say it is a part of the normal functioning of the Muslim world…. The conquered populations change status (they become dhimmis), and the shari’a tends to be put into effect integrally, overthrowing the former law of the country. The conquered territories do not simply change “owners.”

[Muhammad] did at least propose that all Arabia should be the land of Allah and planned vigorous measures to insure that within its borders the religion of Allah should be supreme. Communities of the People of the Book [Book = Bible; thus referring primarily to Jews and Christians] might remain within the land, but they must be in subjection … deriving their rights from the supreme Muslim community, not from any recognized rights of their own. As the Arabs did not accept this without struggle, it had to be forced on them, and that meant war. But war in the cause of Allah is Holy War, and so even in the Prophet’s lifetime we have the question of Jihad?

Communities of the People of the Book [Book = Bible; thus referring primarily to Jews and Christians] might remain within the land, but they must be in subjection … deriving their rights from the supreme Muslim community, not from any recognized rights of their own. As the Arabs did not accept this without struggle, it had to be forced on them, and that meant war. But war in the cause of Allah is Holy War, and so even in the Prophet’s lifetime we have the question of Jihad?

Richard Bell, in his authoritative 1937 translation and exegesis of the Qur’an, demonstrates that Sura 9 “is a chapter of war proclamations,”3 and verses 9.29 to 9.35, specifically, “form in effect a proclamation of war against Jews and Christians, and probably belong to the year IX [9 years after the Hijral when an expedition was designed for the North which would involve war with Christians and possibly also with Jews."

Jeffery belittled as "the sheerest sophistry" attempts made in some circles in modern days to explain away all the Prophet's warlike expeditions as defensive wars or to interpret the doctrine of Jihad as merely a bloodless striving in missionary zeal for the spread of Islam.... The early Arabic sources quite plainly and frankly describe the expeditions as military expeditions, and it would never have occurred to anyone at that day to interpret them as anything else.... To the folk of his day there would thus be nothing strange in Muhammad, as the head of the community of those who served Allah, taking the sword to extend the kingdom of Allah, and taking measures to insure the subjection of all who lived within the borders of what he made the kingdom of Allah.

Writing in 2002, Khaled Abou El Fadl, a professor of law at UCLA, maintained categorically that "Islamic tradition does not have a notion of holy war. Jihad simply means to strive hard or struggle in pursuit of a just cause.... Holy war (al-harb al-muqaddasah) is not an expression used by the Qur'anic text or Muslim theologians. In Islamic theology war is never holy; it is either justified or not.”

The essential pattern of the jihad war is captured in the great Muslim historian al-Tabari's recording of the recommendation given by Umar b. al-Khattab to the commander of the troops he sent to al-Basrah (636 CE), during the conquest of Iraq. Umar (the second "Rightly Guided Caliph") reportedly said: "Summon the people to God; those who respond to your call, accept it from them, (This is to say, accept their conversion as genuine and refrain from fighting them) but those who refuse must pay the poll tax out of humiliation and lowliness. (Qur'an 9:29) If they refuse this, it is the sword without leniency. Fear God with regard to what you have been entrusted.”

Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), Maliki jurist, renowned philosopher, historian, and sociologist, summarized these consensus opinions from five centuries of prior Sunni Muslim jurisprudence with regard to the uniquely Islamic institution of jihad: "In the Muslim community, the holy war is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the [Muslim] mission and [the obligation to] convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force…. The other religious groups did not have a universal mission, and the holy war was not a religious duty for them, save only for purposes of defense…. Islam is under obligation to gain power over other nations

Finally, Shiite jurisprudence was in agreement with the Sunni consensus on the basic nature of jihad war, as reflected in this excerpt from the Jami-i-Abbasi (the popular Persian manual of Shia law) written by al-Amili (d.1622), a distinguished theologian under Shah Abbas I: “Islamic Holy war [jihad] against followers of other religions, such as Jews, is required unless they convert to Islam or pay the poll tax.

By the time of the classical Muslim historian al-Tabari’s death in 923, jihad wars had expanded the Muslim empire from Portugal to the Indian subcontinent. Subsequent Muslim conquests continued in Asia, as well as on Christian lands in eastern Europe. The Christian kingdoms of Armenia, Byzantium, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, and Albania, as well as parts of Poland and Hungary, were also conquered and Islamized. When the Muslim armies were stopped at the gates of Vienna in 1683, more than a millennium of jihad had tran- spired.25 These tremendous military successes spawned a triumphalist jihad literature. Muslim historians recorded in detail the number of infidels slain or enslaved, the cities and villages that were pillaged, and the lands, treasure, and movable goods seized. Christian (Coptic, Armenian, Jacobite, Greek, Slav, etc.), as well as Hebrew sources and even the scant Hindu and Buddhist writings that survived the ravages of the Muslim conquests independently validate this narrative, and complement the Muslim perspective by providing testimonies of the suffering of the non-Muslim victims of jihad wars.

In The Laws of Islamic Governance21 al-Mawardi (d. 1058), also examines the regulations pertaining to the lands and infidel (i.e., non-Muslim) populations subjugated by jihad. This is the origin of the system of dhimmitude. The native infidel population had to recognize Islamic ownership of their land, submit to Islamic law, and accept payment of the poll tax (jizya). Al-Mawardi highlights the most significant aspect of this consensus view of the jizya in classical Islamic jurisprudence: the critical connection between jihad and payment of the jizya. He notes that “[tjhe enemy makes a payment in return for peace and reconciliation." Al-Mawardi then distinguishes two cases: (1) Payment is made immediately and is treated like booty, however "it does, however, not prevent a jihad being carried out against them in the future" (2). Payment is made yearly and will "constitute an ongoing tribute by which their security is established." Reconciliation and security last as long as the payment is made. If the payment ceases, then the jihad resumes.

The nature of such "protection" is clarified in this definition of jizya by the respected Arabic lexicographer E. W. Lane, based on a careful analysis of the etymology of the term: "The tax that is taken from the free non-Muslim subjects of a Muslim government whereby they ratify the compact that assures them protection, as though it were compensation for not being slain.

Another important aspect of the jizva is the widely upheld view of the classical schools of Islamic jurisprudence about the deliberately humiliating imposition and procurement of this tax.It seemed, however, that from the economic point of view, it did not constitute a heavy imposition, since it was on a sliding scale, approximately one, two, and four dinars, and thus adjusted to the financial capacity of the taxpayer. This impression proved to be entirely fallacious, for it did not take into consideration the immense extent of poverty and privation experienced by the masses, and in particular, their persistent lack of cash, which turned the "season of the tax" into one of horror, dread, and misery.

Jewish, Coptic, Syriac, Armenian, and Serbian sources provide copious evidence that the jizva-kharaj was demanded from children, widows, orphans, and even the dead.

Endemic to Muslim-controlled Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia, as well as Armenia, such brutal practices lead to an indelible process of expropriation of the dhimmi peasantry in particular. Onerous taxation, combined with indebtedness to Muslim creditors, forced Christian and Jewish peasants to abandon their mortgaged lands to their Muslim overlords, and go into exile or become slaves.

Collectively, these "obligations" formed the discriminatory system of dhimmitude imposed upon non-Muslims-Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, Hindus, and Buddhists-subjugated by jihad. Some of the more salient features of dhimmitude include: the prohibition of arms for the vanquished non-Muslims (dhimmis) and of church bells; restrictions concerning the building and restoration of churches, synagogues, and temples; inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims with regard to taxes and penal law; the refusal of dhimmi testimony by Muslim courts;42 a requirement that Jews, Christians, and other non-Muslims, including Zoroastrians and Hindus, wear special clothes; and the overall humiliation and abasement of non-Muslims. It is important to note that these regulations and attitudes were institutionalized as permanent features of the sacred Islamic law, or sharia. The writings of the much lionized Sufi theologian and jurist al-Ghazali (d. 1111)-the famous theologian, philosopher, and paragon of mystical Sufism, who, as noted by the renowned scholar W. M. Watt, has been "acclaimed in both the East and West as the greatest Muslim after Muhammad"43-highlight how the institution of dhimmitude was simply a normative and prominent feature of the sharia: [T]he dhimmi is obliged not to mention Allah or His Apostle … Jews, Christians, and Majians must pay the jizya [poll tax on non-Muslims] … on offering up the jizya, the dhimmi must hang his head while the official takes hold of his beard and hits [the dhimmi] on the protruberant bone beneath his ear [i.e., the mandible]…. They are not permitted to ostentatiously display their wine or church bells … their houses may not be higher than the Muslim’s, no matter how low that is. The dhimmi may not ride an elegant horse or mule; he may ride a donkey only if the saddle[-work] is of wood. He may not walk on the good part of the road. They [the dhimmis] have to wear [an identifying] patch [on their clothing], even women, and even in the [public] baths … [dhimmis] must hold their tongue.

Ignaz Goldziher believed that Shiism manifested greater doctrinal intolerance toward non-Muslims, relative to Sunni Islam: On examining the legal documents, we find that the Shi’i legal position toward other faiths is much harsher and stiffer than that taken by Sunni Muslims. Their law reveals a heightened intolerance to people of other beliefs…. Of the severe rule in the Qur’an (9:28) that “unbelievers are unclean,” Sunni Islam has accepted an interpretation that is as good as a repeal. Shi’i law, on the other hand, has maintained the literal sense of the rule; it declares the bodily substance of the unbeliever to be ritually unclean, and lists the touching of an unbeliever among the ten things that produce najasa, ritual impurity.

It is these latter najas prohibitions that lead anthropology professor Laurence Loeb (who studied and lived within the Jewish community of southern Iran in the early 1970s) to observe, “Fear of pollution by Jews led to great excesses and peculiar behavior by Muslims.”

A non-Muslim therefore cannot be a citizen of the State; he is a member of a depressed class; his status is a modified form of slavery. He lives under a contract (zimma, or “dhimma”) with the State: for the life and property grudgingly spared to him by the commander of the faithful he must undergo political and social disabilities, and pay a commutation money. In short, his continued existence in the State after the conquest of his country by the Muslims is conditional upon his person and property made subservient to the cause of Islam.

As the learned Qazi Mughis-ud-din declared, in accordance with the teachings of the books on Canon Law: “The Hindus are designated in the Law as `payers of tribute’ (kharaj-guzar); and when the revenue officer demands silver from them, they should, without question and with all humility and respect, tender gold. If the officer throws dirt into their mouths, they must without reluctance open their mouths wide to receive it.” By these acts of degradation are shown the extreme obedience of the zimmi [dhimmi], the glorification of the true faith of Islam, and the abasement of false faiths. God himself orders them to be humiliated, (as He says, “till they pay jaziya”) with the hand and are humbled. … The Prophet has commanded us to slay them, plunder them, and make them captive…. No other religious authority except the great Imam (Hanifa) whose faith we follow, has sanctioned the imposition of jaziya on Hindu.

Even today, the study of the jihad is part of the curriculum of all the Islamic institutes. In the universities of Al-Azhar, Nagaf, and Zaitoune, students are still taught that the holy war [jihad] is a binding prescriptive decree, pronounced against the Infidels, which will only be revoked with the end of the world…. If he [the dhimmi] is tolerated, it is for reasons of a spiritual nature, since there is always the hope that he might be converted; or of a material nature, since he bears almost the whole tax burden. He has his place in society, but he is constantly reminded of his inferiority…. In no way is the dhimmi the equal of the Muslim. He is marked out for social inequality and belongs to a despised caste; unequal in regard to individual rights; unequal in the Law Courts as his evidence is not admitted by any Muslim tribunal and for the same crime his punishment is greater than that imposed on Muslims…. No social relationship, no fellowship is possible between Muslims and dhimmis.

Bat Ye’or’s seminal contribution to the study of jihad and dhimmitude has been her unique ability to accomplish two related tasks: (1) methodically pooling a vast, rich array of primary source data; (2) providing a brilliant synthetic analysis of these data to demonstrate convincingly the transformative power of jihad and dhimmitude, operating as designed, within formerly Christian societies of the Near East and Asia Minor. Mary Boyce, emeritus professor of Iranian studies at the University of London, has confirmed the external validity of Bat Ye’or’s analytical approach in her description of how jihad and dhimmitude (without the latter being specifically identified as such) transformed Zoroastrian society in an analogous manner. Boyce has written comprehensive assessments of those Zoroastrian communities that survived the devastating jihad conquests of the mid-seventh through early eighth centuries.52 The Zoroastrians experienced an ongoing, inexorable decline over the next millennium due to constant sociopolitical and economic pressures exerted by their Muslim rulers and neighbors. This gradual but continuous process was interspersed with periods of accelerated decline resulting from paroxysms of Muslim fanaticism-pogroms, forced conversions, and expropriations-through the latter half of the nineteenth century. Boyce describes these complementary phenomena based on an historical analysis, and her personal observations living in the central Iranian Yezd area during the 1960s: [I]n the mid nineteenth century disaster overtook Turkabad, in the shape of what was perhaps the last massed forcible conversion in Iran. It no longer seems possible to learn anything about the background of this event; but it happened, so it is said, one autumn day when dye-madder-then one of the chief local crops-was being lifted. All the able-bodied men were at work in teams in the fields when a body of Moslems swooped on the village and seized them. They were threatened, not only with death for themselves, but also with the horrors that would befall their women and children, who were being terrorized at the same time in their homes; and by the end of the day of violence most of the village had accepted Islam. To recant after a verbal acknowledgement of Allah and his prophet meant death in those days, and so Turkabad was lost to the old religion. Its fire-temple was razed to the ground, and only a rough, empty enclosure remained where once it had stood. A similar fate must have overtaken many Iranian villages in the past, among those which did not willingly embrace Islam; and the question seems less why it happened to Turkabad than why it did not overwhelm all other Zoroastrian settlements. The evidence, scanty though it is, shows, however, that the harassment of the Zoroastrians of Yazd tended to be erratic and capricious, being at times less harsh, or bridled by strong governors; and in general the advance of Islam across the plain, through relentless, seems to have been more by slow erosion than by furious force. The process was till going on in the 1960s, and one could see, therefore, how it took effect.

As long as Zoroastrians remained in the majority, their lives were tolerable; but once the Moslems became the more numerous, a petty but pervasive harassment was apt to develop. This was partly verbal, with taunts about fire-worship, and comments on how few Zoroastrians there were in the world, and how many Moslems, who must therefore posses the truth; and also on how many material advantages lay with Islam. The harassment was often also physical; boys fought, and gangs of youth waylaid and bullied individual Zoroastria.

Those with criminal leanings found too that a religious minority provided tempting opportunities for theft, pilfering from the open fields, and sometimes rape and arson.

Following Muhammad’s arrival, he created a “new order,” as described by Gil: [E]stablishing a covenant between the tribes which imposed its authority on every clan and its members, [which] soon enabled him to attack the Jews and eventually wipe out the Jewish population of the town.

He also used the former property of the Jews to establish a war fund, setting up a well-equipped army corps of cavalry troops the likes of which had never before been seen on the Arabian peninsula.Islamic ideology alone gave the Arabs that outward-looking attitude which enabled them to become sufficiently united to defeat the Byzantine and Persian empires. Many of them may have been concerned chiefly with booty for themselves. But men who were merely raiders out for booty could not have held together as the Arabs did. The ideology was no mere epiphenomenon but an essential factor in the historical process.

It was just as impossible for him to make concessions…. Thus the relationship with the Christians ended as that with the Jews ended-in war…. We know that before the end of his life Muhammad was in conflict with Christian populations in the north of Arabia, and even within the confines of the Roman [Byzantine] Empire. What would have happened if he had lived we do not know. But probably the policy which Abu Bakr carried on was the policy of Muhammad himself. There could have been no real compromise. He regarded himself as vicegerent of God upon earth. The true religion could only be Islam as he laid it down, and acceptance of it meant acceptance of his divinely inspired authority…. The Hijra and the execution of the Divine vengeance upon the unbelievers of Mecca had given the immediate occasion for the organization of such a warlike community. The victory of Badr confirmed it.

Within two years of Muhammad’s death, however, Abu Bakr, the first caliph, launched the Great Jihad.59 The ensuing three decades witnessed Islamdom’s most spectacular expansion, as Muslim armies subdued the entire Arabian peninsula, and conquered territories which had been in Greco-Roman possession since the reign of Alexander the Great.

“[B]oth Hellenism and Christianity were eliminated as major ethnic, religious, and cultural forces in the Near East, save in Asia Minor and Cyprus.

Ibn Hudayl, a fourteenth century Granadan author of an important treatise on jihad, outlined (and endorsed) those methods.

It is permissible to set fire to the lands of the enemy, his stores of grain, his beasts of burden-if it is not possible for the Muslims to take possession of them-as well as to cut down his trees, to raze his cities, in a word, to do everything that might ruin and discourage him, provided that the imam (i.e. the religious “guide” of the community of believers) deems these measures appropriate, suited to hastening the Islamization of that enemy or to weakening him. Indeed, all this contributes to a military triumph over him or to forcing him to capitulate.

[T]own populations were not always spared. They often suffered massacre or slavery, always accompanied by deportations. This was the fate of the Christians and Jews of Aleppo, Antioch, Ctesiphon, Euchaita, Constantia, Pathos (Cyprus), Pergamum, Sardes, Germanicea (Marash), and Samosata- to cite but a few examples. In the course of the Umayyads’ last attempt to take Constantinople (717), the Arab army commanded by Maslama carried out a pincer movement by land and sea and laid waste the whole region around the capital.

According to present-day concepts of international relations, such activities amounted to piracy, but they correspond perfectly to jihad, an Islamic religious duty. The conquest of Crete, in the east, and a good portion of the corsair warfare along the Provencal and Italian coasts, in the West, are among the most conspicuous instances of such “private initiative” which contributed to Arab domination in the Mediterranean.

Elizabeth Zachariadou describes the consternation of contemporary fourteenth-century Latin and Byzantine chroniclers observing the “spectacle” of Turkish emirs, “who were proud only because they were able to lead their ferocious soldiers” in such predatory attacks.72 These raids-designed to pillage property and abduct captives for sale in slave markets-although merely ignoble piracy or brigandage from the perspective of the Christian chroniclers, nevertheless, as Zachariadou notes, were “for the Muslim Turks, a Holy War (Jihad), a praiseworthy andlegitimate occupation, leading directly to Paradise.

Gregory Palamus, a metropolitan of Thessalonica during the fourteenth century, wrote this commentary while living as a captive amongst the Turks in 1354, confirming (albeit with astonishment) that indeed the Turks attributed their victories over the Byzantines to their (the Muslims’) love of God: “For these impious people, hated by God and infamous, boast of having got the better of the Romans by their love of God … they live by the bow, the sword and debauchery, finding pleasure in taking slaves, devoting themselves to murder, pillage, spoil … and not only do they commit these crimes, but eve-what an aberration-they believe that God approves of them. This is what I think of them, now that I know precisely about their way of life.”74 More than 650 years later, and a continent (and oceans) away, C. Snouck Hurgronje reported (in 1906) that similar acts of jihad piracy were still being performed against non-Muslims (both indigenous populations and Western traders) by the Muslim Acehnese of the Indonesian archipelago: From Mohammedanism (which for centuries she [i.e., Aceh] is reputed to have accepted) she really only learnt a large number of dogmas relating to hatred of the infidel without any of their mitigating concomitants; so the Acehnese made a regular business of piracy and man-hunting at the expense of the neighboring non-Mohammedan countries and islands, and considered that they were justified in any act of treachery or violence to European (and latterly to American) traders who came in search of pepper, the staple product of the country. Complaints of robbery and murder on board ships trading in Acehnese parts thus grew to be chronic 7s JIHAD ON LAND Jihad Conquests and Early Muslim Rule in Syro-Palestine Moshe Gil, in his comprehensive analysis A History of Palestine, 634-1099, emphasizes the singular centrality that Palestine occupied in the mind of its pre-Islamic Jewish inhabitants, who referred to the land as “al-Sham.” Indeed, as Gil observes, the sizable Jewish population in Palestine (who formed a majority of its inhabitants, when grouped with the Samaritans) at the dawn of the Arab Muslim conquest were “the direct descendants of the generations of Jews who had lived there since the days of Joshua bin Nun, in other words for some 2000 years.”76 He also explodes the ahistorical thesis of scholars who perceive an ethnic motivation behind the [jihad] conquests. They see Arabs everywhere: even the Canaanites and the Philistines were Arabs, according to their theories. This applies to an even greater degree to the population of Palestine and Syria in the seventh century, who were certainly Semites. Thus, according to their claims, the conquering Arab forces in the course of their battles, actually encountered their own people or at least members of their own race who spoke the same language…. This is of course a very distorted view: Semitism is not a race and only relates to a sphere of language. The populations met along the route of battle, living in cities or the country side, were not Arabs and did not speak Arabic. We do know of Bedouin tribes at that time who inhabited the borderlands and the southern desert of Palestine, west of the Euphrates (Hira) in the Syrian desert, Palmyra, and elsewhere. But the cultivated inner regions and the cities were inhabited by Jews and Christians who spoke Aramaic. They did not sense any special ties to the Bedouin; if anything it was the contrary. Their proximity and the danger of an invasion from that quarter disturbed their peace of mind and this is amply reflected both in the writings of the Church Fathers and in Talmudic sources 77 Gil concludes that views of the jihad conquest of Palestine expressed in the sources from the vanquished, indigenous non-Muslim populations reflect the attitude of the towns and villages in Palestine quite accurately; the attitude of a sedentary population, of farmers and craftsmen, toward nomads whose source of income is the camel and who frequently attack the towns, pillage and…

Abbasid rule (approximately 750-755 CE, perhaps during the reign Abul Abbas Abdullah al-Saffah), Greek sources report orders demanding the removal of crosses over churches, bans on church services and teaching of the scriptures, the eviction of monks from their monasteries, and excessive taxation.88 Gil notes that in 772 CE, when Caliph al-Mansur visited Jerusalem,89 “he ordered a special mark should be stamped on the hands of the Christians and the Jews. Many Christians fled to Byzantium.

Perhaps the clearest outward manifestations of the inferiority and humiliation of the dhimmis were the prohibitions regarding their dress “codes” and the demands that distinguishing signsbe placed on the entrances of dhimmi houses. During the Abbasid caliphates of Harun al-Rashid (786-809) and al-Mutawwakil (847-861), Jews and Christians were required to wear yellow (as patches attached to their garments or hats).94 Later, to differentiate further between Christians and Jews, the Christians were required to wear blue. In 850, consistent with Qur’anic verses associating them with Satan and hell,95 al-Mutawwakil decreed that Jews and Christians attach wooden images of devils to the doors of their homes to distinguish them from the homes of Muslims. Bat Ye’or summarizes the oppression of the dhimmis throughout the Abbasid Empire under al-Mutawwakil as “a wave of religious persecution, forced conversions, and the elimination of churches and synagogues.

Citing both Muslim (al-Quda’i, Ibn Khallikan, and Ibn Al-Athir) and non-Muslim (Bar Hebraeus) sources, Gil also describes the edicts al-Hakim imposed upon the Christians and Jews beginning in August 1011: They were ordered to wear black turbans. The Christians had to wear a cross the length of a cubit and weighing five ratls around their necks around their necks; the Jews were obliged to wear a block of wood of similar weight … they had to wear some distinguishing mark in the bath-houses, and finally al-Hakim decided that there were to be separate bath-houses for their use…. Ibn Al-Athir conveys … that al-Hakim ordered (after the destruction of the Chucrh of the Resurrection in Jerusalem … ) that all the churches in the realm be destroyed, and this was done, and that the Jews and Christians were then to accept Islam, or emigrate to Byzantine lands. They were also obliged to wear special distinguishing signs. Many converted….

Muslim population in European cities

I was recently asked which cities in Europe have the highest Muslim percentage. The following is what I found in my research.
I linked to my sources, but note that not all sources have the same reliability level. STAT – official municipal or national statistics, EUMAP – EU Research program, WIKI – Wikipedia, NEWS – mentioned in the news.
If my readers have more information, I will be glad to integrate it into this list.
Note that in some of these cities, there are neighborhoods which have a much higher percentage of Muslims (for example: Kreuzberg in Berlin, Molenbeek in Brussels and Tower Hamlets in London) and neighborhoods with a much lower percentage.
Austria
Vienna – 8% (120,000) (NEWS)
Belgium
Antwerp- 6.7% (>30,000 of >450,000) (EUMAP)
Brussels (region) – 17%-20% (160,000-220,000) [some say 33% (City of Brussels?)] (NEWS, NEWS)
Denmark
Aarhus – ~10% (NEWS)
Copenhagen – 12.6% (63,000 of 500,000) ( EUMAP)
France
Ile de France – 10%-15% (up to 1.7 milliion) (NEWS)
Marseilles – 25% (200,000 of 800,000) (NEWS), PACA region – 20% (0.7-1.0 million of 1.5 million) (EUMAP)
Paris – 7.38% (155,000 of 2.1 million) (EUMAP)
Strasbourg – 10% (NEWS)
Germany
Berlin – 5.9% (~200,000 of 3.40 million) (EUMAP)
Cologne – 12% (120,000 of 1 million) (WIKI)
Hamburg – 6.4% (~110,000 of 1.73 million) (EUMAP)
The Netherlands
Amsterdam – 24% (180,000 of 750,000) (STAT), Greater Amsterdam – 12.7% (STAT)
The Hague – 14.2% ( 67,896 of 475,580) (STAT), Greater Hague – 11% (STAT)
Rotterdam – 13% (80,000 of 600,000) (EUMAP), Greater Rotterdam – 9.9% (STAT)
Utrecht – 13.2% (38,300 of 289,000) (STAT), Greater Utrecht – 7% (STAT)
Zaan district – 8.8% (STAT)
Russia
Moscow – 16%-20% (2 million of 10-12 million) (NEWS)
Sweden
Malmö – ~25% (NEWS) [percent of immigrants, foreign born or both parents foreign born: 36% (STAT)]
Stockholm – 20% (>155,000 of 771,038) (EUMAP) [percent of immigrants: 36% (STAT)]
United Kingdom
Birmingham – 14.3% (139,771) (WIKI)
Bradford – 16% (75,000) (NEWS)
Leicester – 11% (>30,000 of 280,000) (EUMAP)
Greater London – 8.5%-17% (1.3 million of 7.5 million) (NEWS, WIKI)
Luton – 14.6% (26,963) (WIKI)
Thanks to Nieuw Religieus Peil for helping collect the data.
Updated: September 7, 2010

http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/2007/11/muslim-population-in-european-cities.html